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BOOK REVIEW
EQUALITY AS A CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE
by Harry V. Jaffa*
T-I BASIC SYMBOLS 01 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION. By
Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press. 1970. Pp. xi, 163. $6.00.
So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for
this is the law and the prophets.
-Jesus
As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses
my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to -the extent of the
difference, is no democracy.
-Abraham Lincoln
1.
That Conservatism should search for its meaning implies of course
that Conservatism does not have the meaning for which it is searching.
This might appear paradoxical, since a Conservative is supposed to
have something definite to conserve. Unfriendly critics sometimes
suggest that what we Conservatives conserve, or wish to conserve, is
money. But since many of us, like Socrates, live in thousand-fold pov-
erty, this is manifestly untrue. Yet our plight might be said to re-
semble that of a man with a great hoard of gold or diamonds. Suppose
such a man suddenly awoke to find that his treasure was no longer pre-
cious, and that it held no more meaning for the rest of the world than
sand or pebbles. How strange the world would look to that man! How
strange that man would look to the world, vainly clinging to his pile
of rubbish.
* Henry Salvatori Research Professor of Government at Claremont Men's College.
Author of several books including Crisis of The House Divided: An Interpretation of
the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (1959). This review was originally prepared
for delivery at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.
The theme of the panel, presided over by William F. Buckley, Jr., was "Conservatism's
Search for Meaning."
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In today's political vocabulary, Conservatism is contrasted with Lib-
eralism and Radicalism. In this strange world, however, I cannot imag-
ine Liberalism or Radicalism searching for meaning. Liberalism and
Radicalism are confident of their meaning, and the world is confident
of their confidence. Yet once upon a time, a Liberal was thought to
be more diffident. He was someone who recognized the fallibility of
human reason and its susceptibility to the power of the passions. He
tended therefore to be tolerant of human differences. A liberal re-
gime was one in which such differences were in a sense institution-
alized. James Madison's extended republic embracing a multiplicity
of factions, in which no faction might become a majority or impose its
will upon a majority, is the classic instance in the modern world of
such a regime. But the New Liberal is committed to policies which
tend not to recognize the propriety of differences. Consider the rigid-
ity of such slogans as "one man, one vote," "racial balance," "affirm-
ative action," "guaranteed income," "war on poverty," "generation of
peace." All these imply a degree of certainty as to what is beneficial,
which makes those who doubt appar to be obscurantists or obstruc-
tionists, standing in the way of welfare either out of stupidity or out
of a vested interest in ill fare.
The only significant differences I can see between today's Liberals
and today's Radicals concern means rather than ends. How often dur-
ing the "troubles" of the late 1960's did we hear the Liberals deplore
the Radicals' violence, telling them that they should "work within the
system"? How often did we hear these same Liberals praise the Radi-
cals for their "idealism," asking only that they learn patience? But the
Radicals made a great deal more sense. If their ideals were so praise-
worthy, then a system which obstructed their fulfillment was blame-
worthy. And why work within a blameworthy system for praiseworthy
ends?Liberalism and Radicalism both reject the wisdom of the past, as en-
shrined in the institutions of the past, or in the morality of the past.
They deny legitimacy to laws, governments, or ways of life which ac-
cept the ancient evils of mankind, such as poverty, inequality, and war,
as necessary-and therefore as permanent-attributes of the human
condition. Political excellence can no longer be measured by the de-
gree to which it ameliorates such evils. The only acceptable goal is
their abolition. Liberalism and Radicalism look forward to a state of
things in which the means of life, and of the good life, are available
to all. They -must be available in such a way that the full development
of each individual-which is how the good life is defined-is not
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merely compatible with, but is necessary to, the full development of
all. Competition between individuals, classes, races, and nations must
come to an end. Competition itself is seen as the root of the evils man-
kind must escape. The good society must be characterized only by co-
operation and harmony. The Old Liberalism saw life as a race, in
which justice demanded for everyone only a fair or equal chance in
the competition. But the New Liberalism sees 'the race itself as wrong.
In every race there can be but one winner, and there must be many
losers. Thus the Old Liberalism preserved the inequality of the Few
over and against the Many. It demanded the removal of artificial or
merely conventional inequalities. But it recognized and demanded the
fullest scope for natural inequalities. But the New Liberalism denies
natural no less than conventional inequalities. In the Heaven of the
New Liberalism, as in that of the Old Theology, all will be rewarded
equally. The achievement of the good society is itself the only victory.
But this victory is not to be one of man over man, but of mankind over
the scourges of mankind. No one in it will taste the bitterness of de-
feat. No one need say, "I am a loser, but I have no right to complain.
I had a fair chance." The joys of victory will belong to all. Unlike the
treasures of the past, the goods of the future will be possessed by all.
They will not be diminished or divided by being common. On the con-
trary, they will for that very reason increase and intensify. No one will
be a miser-or a Conservative.
I have intimated that what is today called Conservatism-the New
Conservatism-may in fact be the Old Liberalism. Indeed, it may be
the Old Radicalism as well. Leo Strauss used to delight in pointing
out that the most conservative or even reactionary organization in the
United States was called the Daughters of the American Revolution.
Certainly, if American Conservatism has any core of consistency and
purpose, it is derived from the American Founding. The uncertainty
as to the meaning of American Conservatism is, as we shall see, an
uncertainty as to the meaning of the American Founding. But
this uncertainty does not arise from any doubt as to the status of the
Revolution. So far as I know, there has never been any Benedict Ar-
nold Society of American Patriotism. Nor do American Conservatives
meet, either openly or secretly, to toast "the King (or Queen) across
the water." The status of feudalism and monarchy are for American
Conservatives exactly what they are for American Liberals or Radicals.
Perhaps the best description of the Ancien Regime from the American
point of view is still that of Mark Twain in A Connecticut Yankee in
King Arthur's Court.
1975]
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American Conservatism is then rooted in a Founding which is, in
turn, rooted in revolution. Moreover, the American Revolution repre-
sented the most radical break with tradition-with the tradition of Eu-
rope's feudal past-that the world had seen. It is true that the Ameri-
can revolutionaries saw some precedent for their actions in the Whig
Revolution of 1689. But that revolution at least maintained the fiction
of a continued and continuous legality. The British Constitution that
resulted from the earlier revolution may have had some republican ele-
ments. But the American constitutions-state and federal-that re-
sulted from the later revolution had no monarchical or aristocratic ele-
ments. They were not merely radically republican, but were radically
republican in a democratic sense.' The sovereignty of the people has
never been challenged within the American regime, by Conservatives
any more than by Liberals or Radicals.
The regime of the Founders was wholly devoted to what they under-
stood as civil and religious liberty and was in that sense a liberal re-
gime. But the Founders understood themselves to be revolutionaries,
and to celebrate the American Founding is therefore to celebrate rev-
olution. However mild or moderate the American Revolution may
now appear, as compared with subsequent revolutions in France, Rus-
sia, China, Cuba, or elsewhere, it nonetheless embodied the greatest
attempt at innovation that human history had recorded. It remains the
most radical attempt to establish a regime of liberty that the world has
yet seen.
2.
What were the principles of the American Revolution? What are
the roots of the American Founding? One would think that after
nearly two hundred years this question could be easily answered.
Never did men take more pains to justify what they were doing at every
step of the way than did the patriots of the Revolution. Never was
the fashioning of a plan of government better documented than that
hammered out in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. Never was
such a plan more fully debated before adoption than -that which
came before the several ratifying conventions. Never was an actual
regime, as distinct from a hypothetical one, so enshrined in theoretical
reasoning as was the constitution of 1787 in the Federalist Papers.
And yet the matter is unresolved.
1. On the difference between the Whiggery of the English and American Revolutions,
see H.V. JAFFA, EQUALITY AND LmERTY: THEORY AND PRACTiCE IN AMERICAN PoLITIcs
ch. 6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as EQUA.ITY AND LIBERTY].
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Our perplexity that this should be so is less surprising when we re-
flect that the course of American history for more than "four score and
seven years" was one of deep-seated controversy, culminating in one
of the bitterest wars of modem times. Until the resort to arms, these
confliots almost always took the form of debates as to the meaning of
the Founding. And the Founding documents, and their principal glos-
ses, were invariably cited on both sides in these debates. In more res-
pects than one, American history and Jewish history resembled each
other. Mid-century British liberals, like their American counterparts,
were also divided. In 1861 Lord Acton wrote an essay entitled
Political Causes of the American Revolution,' in which he expressed
no doubt that the Confederacy was fighting for the same principles of
independence for which Washington had fought. But Lord Acton's
countryman, John Stuart Mill, in another essay written shortly after-
wards,' was just as sure that Lincoln's government was fighting to pre-
serve these same principles. That the contestants appealed to the
same political dogmas--even as they read the same Bible and prayed
to the same God-only intensified the struggle. As sectarians of the
same faith, they fought each other as only those fight who see their
enemies, as heretics.
American Conservatism today is still divided, not surprisingly, along
lines which have divided Americans since before the Civil War. Sir
Winston Churchill once said that the American Civil War was the last
great war fought between gentlemen. Certainly Churchill had in mind
the patriotism and the gallantry of men like Lee, Jackson, and Davis
on the Confederate side, and Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman on the side
of the Union. But I think he also had in mind the dignity of the prin-
ciples that both sides held, and the tragedy inherent in the possibility
that these same principles should seem to speak differently to men of
equal integrity and devotion.
But gentlemanship, like patriotism, is not enough. Not Jefferson
Davis or, for that matter, John C. Calhoum-surely one of the most in-
telligent men who ever lived-saw as deeply into the meaning of the
American principles as Abraham Lincoln. And so-to borrow a
phrase from the late Wilimoore Kendall-let us have no foolishness
about both sides being equally right. That the South lost the war on
the battlefield does not in the least mean that it lost the argument.
2. 5 THE RAmBLER (New Series), May, 1861, at 17 (reprinted in EssAYS ON FREEDOM
AND PowER 171 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1955)).
3. THE CONTEST IN AMERICA (1862) (reprinted from FRAsER's MAGAZINE, Feb.-May,
1862).
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From Alexander Stephens to Willmoore Kendall, its champions have
lost none of their fervor. So far are they from admitting defeat, that,
on the contrary, they repeatedly proclaim victory.
In a recent book entitled The Basic Symbols of the American Politi-
cal Tradition, Kendall, together with George Carey, takes the position
that the arch-heretic, the man who "derailed" our tradition, was Abra-
ham Lincoln. According to Kendall and Carey, all the Liberal and
Radical demands, which would today transform constitutional into total-
itarian government, are imperatives of Equality. And the power of this
idea, or the power which the Radicals and Liberals have derived from
it, stems from a misinterpretation or misapplication of the Declaration
of Independence. According to Kendall and Carey, the Declaration is
not the central document of our Founding, nor is it the true source of
the symbols of the Founding. Nor does the expression of the doctrine
of Equality in the Declaration mean what Abraham Lincoln said it
meant, nor what the Liberals and Radicals of today wish it to mean.
Nothing in our pre-Revolutionary past, or in the constitution-building
period of the Revolutionary generation, justified making Equality the
end or goal to be secured by the American regime. Equality as an
end became the official principle of the regime only by a retrospective
interpretation of "four score and seven years," an interpretation en-
shrined by Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg. The Gettsburg Address,
say Kendall and Carey, was a rhetorical trick. It made the victory of
the Union armies the occasion for an official transformation of our con-
stitutional, Conservative revolutionary past, into a sanction for a Radi-
cal-Liberal revolutionary future.
3.
Now we maintain that the truth about these matters is almost the
exact opposite of what Kendall and Carey say it is. We believe that
the Declaration of Independence is the central document of our politi-
cal tradition, not because of any trick played by Abraham Lincoln, but
because it is the most eloquent, as well as the most succinct, statement
of the political teaching of all the great documents of the period. The
sentiments of the Declaration are not unique to it. Jefferson was the
draftsman of a representative assembly, and his gift lay in finding mem-
orable phrases that articulated the thoughts that everyone wished ex-
pressed. The doctrine of Equality, which is indeed the key to all the
thoughts in the Declaration, is -also to be found in at least seven of the
bills of rights accompanying the original state constitutions.4 It is im-
4. See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
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plied if not expressed in the Declaration of the First Continental Con-
gress (1774) and in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of
Taking Up Arms (1775). Kendall and Carey believe that the idea
of Equality dropped out of sight when the constitution of 1787 came
to be written, and that the constitutional morality of the Federalist
Papers has nothing to do with it. They are dead wrong on both counts.
The idea of Equality, as expressed in the Declaration, is the key to
the morality of "the laws of nature and of nature's God." It is this
natural law which the Constitution-and the regime of which the Con-
stitution is a feature-is designed to implement. The abandonment
of the idea of Equality is perforce an abandonment of that morality
and that constitutionalism. It is perforce an abandonment of the
"ought" for the "is." It would be an abandonment of that higher law
tradition which is the heart of that civility-and that Conservatism-
which judges men and nations by permanent standards. As we pro-
pose to demonstrate, the commitment to Equality in the American poli-
tical tradition is synonymous with the commitment to -those permanent
standards. Whoever rejects the one, of necessity rejects the other, and
in that rejection opens the way to the relativism and historicism that
is the theoretical ground of modem totalitarian regimes.
4.
Basic Symbols is replete with references -to the "enormous impact
on American scholarship and thinking7'5 of Lincoln's alleged "derail-
ment" of the American political tradition. Yet Kendall and Carey do
not provide a single example of that "derailed" scholarship. The cen-
tral role of Equality in American life and -thought was asserted long
ago by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America, written in
the 1830's. Lincoln grew up in the Jacksonian America that Tocque-
ville had observed, and it is hardly surprising that he responded power-
fully to what was already the most powerful force in the world in which
he moved. That the Gettysburg Address somehow transformed the
ethos of American life-and of American scholarship-would have re-
quired a demonstration that Kendall and Carey nowhere attempt. It
would have required an analysis of Lincoln's reasoning on Equality, in
its theoretical and practical bearings, pointing out how and why this
was a new way of understanding Equality and how this new way had
affected others. That is to say, it would have required evidence that
Equality was now understood differently because of Lincoln and that
5. P. 156.
19751
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the way Equality was now understood was not because of an inheri-
tance from pre-Lincolnian egalitarianism, or from that inheritance mod-
ified by any of the other countless writers on the subject.
In fact, the only work which has ever attempted a full analysis of
the theoretical and practical meaning of Equality in Lincoln's political
thought is my Crisis of the House Divided." In it I pointed out that
American historical scholarship, insofar as it had perceived the impact
of Equality upon Lincoln's policies in the 1850's, had thoroughly re-
jected it. Indeed, in the field of Lincoln scholarship, as distinct from
popular writing, Crisis of the House Divided was, as far as I know, the
first book in the Twentieth Century to take a distinctly favorable view
of Lincoln's policies in the 1850's. Since its publication in 1959, Don
E. Fehrenbacher's Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's
(1962), has made a powerful addition to this point of view.
The seven hundred years' providential march of Equality, of which
Tocqueville wrote,7 'has certainly continued, as Tocqueville predicted
it would. Many of its effects have been bad, as he .also predicted.
Tocqueville was much influenced in his view of Jacksonian America
by the American Whigs 'he met-by the party of Adams, Clay, and
Webster. He never met a young follower of these men named Abra-
ham Lincoln. Yet Lincoln's articulation of the Whig critique of a dem-
agogic egalitarianism, expressed particularly in his Lyceum (1838)8
and Temperance (1842)9 speeches, contains remarkable parallels to
Tocqueville. Certainly Lincoln and Tocqueville saw the threat to the
nation from slavery and racial difference in very similar ways. To im-
pute an indiscriminate egalitarianism to Lincoln, as Kendall and Carey
do, is as absurd as to impute it to Tocqueville.
Vaguely imputing Lincolnian effects to American scholarship, Basic
Symbols nowhere comes to grips with the character of Lincoln's
thought. Nor does it ever allude to the articulation of that thought in
Crisis of the House Divided. This is all the more remarkable, in that
Kendall not only had read Crisis, but had published a lengthy review
6. H.V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN
THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (1959) (reprinted in 1973, Univ. of Wash. Press)
[hereinafter cited as CRISIS].
7. 2 A. DE TOCQUEviLLE, D)EMOCIACY IN AMmuCA 34-35, 99-103, 215-21, 226-27,
304-05 (H. Reeve ed. 1945).
8. 1 TiE COLLECrED WORKs OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108-15 (R. Basler ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as LINCOLN].
9. Id. at 271-79.
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of it in National Review,10 which he reprinted in The Conservative'Af-
firmation.11 Had he thought ill of it, we could understand his passing
over it later. But in fact he praised it extravagantly. We believe it
to be the most generous review ever written about a book with which
the reviewer so thoroughly disagreed. We feel obliged -to quote it at
some length now, not because of the praise, but because of the
disagreement. We do so, moreover, because it seems to us to explain
a missing link in Basic Symbols' polemic against Lincoln. Basic Sym-
bols is silent not only about the actual reasoning in Lincoln's thought
about Equality, but also about the great subject that occasioned nearly
everything Lincoln said and wrote about Equality: slavery. So far as
I can recall, the word "slavery" never occurs in Basic Symbols. Yet
Basic Symbols wrestles with Equality on every page-like Jacob wrest-
ling with the Angel of the Lord, we are tempted to say. To do so,
without once mentioning slavery, would be like a critique of Hamlet
that never mentions the ghost. Fortunately, Kendall does mention
slavery in his review of Crisis of the House Divided and enables us
thereby to form a juster view of what he says about Equality in Basic
Symbols.
Kendall states, quite correctly, that "The central problem of Crisis
of the House Divided is the status in the American political tradition
of the 'all men are created equal' clause of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." 2 He adds that
. . . Jaffa's Lincoln (and Jaffa) sees it as the indispensable presupposi-
tion of the entire American political experience; either you accept it as
the standard which that experience necessarily takes as its point of de-
parture, or you deny the meaning of the entire American experience.
As for the status of Abraham Lincoln vis-&-vis the Signers and Framers,
Jaffa's Lincoln sees the great task of the nineteenth century as that of
affirming the cherished accomplishment of the Fathers by transcending
it. Concretely, this means to construe the equality clause as having an
allegedly unavoidable meaning with which it was always pregnant, but
which the Fathers apprehended only dimly.' 3
According to Kendall, the question which is "tacit, but present on every
page of the book,"' 4 is the question
10. Kendall, Book Review, 7 NAT'L REV. 461 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Book Re-
view].
11. W. KS NiALL, THE CONSERVATIVE AFFmnTION 249-52 (1963).
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whether the Civil War was, from the standpoint of natural right and the
cause of self-government, the "unnecessary war" of the historians of the
past fifty or sixty years, or a war that had to be fought in the interest
of freedom for all mankind.
Jaffa's answer to the question is that the war did indeed have to be
fought-once the South had gone beyond slaveholding. . to assert the
"positive goodness" of slavery, and so to deny the validity of the equal-
ity-clause standard as the basic axiom of our political system. ...
And, within the limits to which he for sound reasons of strategy confines
himself, Jaffa's case for that answer seems to this reviewer as nearly as
possible irrefragable.
His readers will, therefore, be well-advised to keep a sharp lookout
for those limits, lest Jaffa launch them, and with them the nation, upon
a political future the very thought of which is hair-raising: a future
made up of an endless series of Abraham Lincolns, each persuaded that
he is superior in wisdom and virtue to the Fathers, each prepared to
insist that those who oppose this or that new application of the equality
standard are denying the possibility of self-government, each ultimately
willing to plunge America into Civil War rather than concede his point
The limits 'I speak of are set by the alternatives that Jaffa steadfastly
-plausibly but steadfastly-refuses to consider, namely: that a negoti-
ated solution might have been worked out in terms of compensating the
Southerners for their slaves and attempting some sort of radical confron-
tation of the Negro problem, and that the Southerners were entitled to
secede if the issue was to be drawn in Lincoln's terms. 15
In his concluding paragraph, Kendall declared:
The idea of natural right is not so easily reducible to the equality
clause, and there are better ways of demonstrating the possibility of self-
government than imposing one's own views concerning natural right
upon others.16
5.
What are those "limits" which Kendall so earnestly warned my read-
ers to beware? We confess to having been completely unaware of
-them. If they have served any reasons of strategy the reasons are Ken-
dall's, not ours. These limits turn out, upon inspection, to be certain
"alternatives" that we are "plausibly but steadfastly" supposed to have
refused to consider. But there is a simple explanation why we did not




consider them in Crisis of the House Divided. That book was an inter-
pretation of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, which we viewed as embrac-
ing the principal issues dividing the American people between the
Mexican War and the Civil War. The Preface to Crisis stated plainly
that it was intended as the first of two volumes. The topics Kendall
said we had avoided belonged plainly to the second volume, to the per-
iod after Lincoln's election in 1860. There was then no strategy be-
hind our alleged refusal other than a chronological division within my
subject. -
Although that second volume has not yet appeared, there is a survey
of the great issues of Lincoln's presidency in my essay, The Emancipa-
tion Proclamation.'7 In it I faced squarely enough the issues Kendall
said I had avoided in Crisis. Kendall knew therefore that if -the case
for Lincoln was, "as nearly as possible irrefragable" within the hypo-
thetical limits he had assigned to it, it was just as irrefragable despite
them. He and Carey simply refused to face -that argument in Basic
Symbols and preferred instead to pretend that it did not exist. We
shall see why.
6.
What then were the proposals that Kendall said that Jaffa-he really
meant Lincoln-had refused to consider, that might justly have pre-
vented the Civil War? First, "that a -negotiated solution might have
been worked out in terms of compensating the Southerners for their
slaves. ... "I Second, that -there might have been "some sort of rad-
ical confrontation of the Negro problem."'" And third, that the South
should have been allowed "to secede if the issue was to be drawn
in Lincoln's terms."20
What in the world did Kendall mean by a "negotiated solution!'?
Many attempts at compromise were made in the winter of 1860-1861,
the most famous of which bore the name of Senator Crittenden of Ken-
tucky. Many long books have been written about -these efforts, and
we propose to write -another one-but not now. Suffice it to say that
Lincoln would not consent to any compromise which involved conced-
ing to the South the right to extend slavery into federal territories.
However, under existing federal law-i.e., under the Supreme Court's
17. In 100 YEARs OF EMANCipATION 1 (R. Goldwin ed. 1963) (reprinted in EQUALrr
AND LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 140).
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ruling in the case of Dred Scott=--there was no legal inhibition in 1861
against any slaveowner actually taking slaves into any federal terri-
tory open to settlement. Moreover, -there was no immediate prospect
that that ruling would change. Nor could there be any Republican
or anti-slavery majority in either house of Congress, unless the South-
ern members absented themselves. It was against fears of the
future that secession took place, and it is hard to know what compro-
mise Kendall wished Lincoln to endorse that presumably would have
made him the statesman of Kendallian consensus. Lincoln himself
thought that nothing would satisfy the South at that juncture except a
complete reversal on the slavery question by the most moderate and
conservative of the anti-slavery leaders. They must cease saying slav-
ery is wrong and that it should be restricted to those states where it
was now lawful and must say instead that it is right and should
be extended to wherever slaveowners could carry it. Did Kendall be-
lieve that, in a free society, men could be asked to declare against their
deepest convictions?
Kendall speaks of "compensating the Southerners for their slaves. 22
By this I presume he intends some scheme of compensated emancipa-
tion. But given the state of parties and of political opinion in 1860-
1861, such a proposal is wildly anachronistic. It would resemble a pro-
posal today that detente with the Soviet Union be pursued by a plan
for buying up the Soviet state industries and returning them to free cap-
italistic enterprise. Kendall seems not to recognize that the issues
which divided Americans on the eve of the Civil War had no direct
or immediate reference to slavery in the states where it existed, but
had solely to do with the extension of slavery. In his inaugural address,
Lincoln said-repeating a passage from an earlier speech---" 'I have
no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of
slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I 'have no lawful right
to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' "2 For more than a gen-
eration, John C. Calhoun had drilled the South in the lesson that they
must never, never, never, never, by the remotest inference, concede
the slightest federal jurisdiction over the domestic institution of slavery.
For example, they must not concede federal power over slavery even
in the District of Columbia, because it had been carved out of slave
states. Nor must they admit the right of Congress to receive abolition-
21. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. Book Review, supra note 10, at 462.
23. 4 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 263.
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ist petitions even for the pupose of rejecting them. Nor must they
admit the right even of the federal post to deliver abolitionist literature
in the states that outlawed it. While Lincoln certainly did not share
these extreme views, he was nonetheless sympathetic with the difficul-
ties of the white South in dealing with what he called the "necessities"
of the actual presence of slavery amongst them. It was just because
he estimated those necessities so justly that Lincoln would not consider
any compromise that carried slavery into lands where it was not already
rooted. But to have proposed emancipation in 1860 or 1861, would
have been regarded as an -act of bad faith. Far from being an instru-
ment of negotiation or compromise, as Kendall seems to think, it would
have been a firebrand.
7.
We digress briefly here to consider the actual plans of emancipation
that Lincoln put forward at different times in 'his career-although not
in the secession crisis of 1860-1861. We do so, among other reasons,
because they demonstrate the absurdity of a myth that Kendall and
Carey assiduously promote, that Lincoln was somehow the spiritual fa-
ther of the New Deal, of the expanded presidency of -the -twentieth cen-
tury, and of the welfare state. Lincoln took almost no part in the form-
ulation of what we might call the "domestic legislation" of his presi-
dency. The Republican Party over which he presided sponsored a
great deal of new legislation, dealing with a national banking system,
promoting a national railroad system, providing homestead legislation,
providing the land grants that led to the great system of state universi-
ties, and providing new tariffs for the growing manufacturing industries
of the North, and so on. Lincoln signed these bills into law as a mat-
ter of course. Most of them were basically Whig measures which he
had long endorsed. They were the foundation of that ebullient capital-
ism later called the age of the "robber barons." Lincoln himself was al-
most wholly occupied with the prosecution of the war. Any expansions
of federal authority attributable to Lincoln stemmed from his inter-
pretation of his constitutional duty "that the Laws be faithfully execu-
ted" and from his authority, "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion," as
commander-in-chief. These were crisis powers, they were not expan-
sions of the commerce clause, of the general welfare clause, or of any
of those enumerated powers by which Congress has in the twentieth
century added to the powers of the presidency. Lincoln did very little,
if anything, to expand the powers of the federal government per se.
What he did under the war powers- did not set precedents for an ex-
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panded peace time role of the presidency in particular, or for the fed-
eral government in general. In fact, much of Lincoln's long struggle
against the Congressional Radicals was a struggle to keep Congress
from assuming powers over persons and property that Lincoln did not
believe the federal government possessed. As long as the executive
exercised them, as incidents of the war powers, they did not become
permanent additions to federal jurisdiction.
Ever since Lincoln had been a Whig Congressman during the Mexi-
can War he had supported the idea of emancipation for the District
of Columbia. Although he believed that Congress 'had full sovereignty
over all aspects of slavery in the District, he was opposed to outright
abolition. The plan that had his support had these three elements.
First, the abolition had -to be gradual. (The plan 'that he proposed dur-
ing the Civil War would have allowed up to thirty-seven years for its
accomplishment.) Second, it had to be authorized, not only -by Con-
gress, but also by a majority of the qualified voters of the District. (Does
this sound like Kendall's Lincoln, "imposing his own view concerning
natural right upon others"?) And third, compensation had to be made
to the owners of the slaves emancipated.
When Lincoln came to propose a national plan for emancipation in
December, 1862, it possessed all these elements of voluntarism. To
insure that this was so, Lincoln insisted that the authorizing legislation
be incorporated in a series of constitutional amendments. These
amendments would provide that the federal government be enabled to
indemnify those states which had voluntarily adopted systems of grad-
ual, compensated emancipation. The federal government would not,
under Lincoln's plan, require the states to adopt such plans. But it
would facilitate their doing so, by assuming all or most of -the financial
burden of such plans. But true to his inaugural pledge that the Con-
stitution did not authorize any federal jurisdiction over slavery in the
states, Lincoln required an amendment to the Constitution even to pay
money to enable the states to do more conveniently what they might
wish to do about slavery. It is worth noting that Lincoln's proposal
would not have provided any precedent for the innumerable federal
grant-in-aid programs of the twentieth century. By requiring a consti-
tutional amendment to permit the federal government to pay money
-to -the states for one particular specified purpose, Lincoln would not-
to repeat-have done anything to expand federal jurisdiction over the
domestic institutions or internal commerce of any state.
But why did Lincoln propose any scheme of emancipation during the
war? The answer -to this is that Lincoln's inaugural pledge could not
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be maintained in the face of a war it did not contemplate. By Sep-
tember of 1862 Lincoln was convinced that he had to strike at slavery
if the war was to be won and the Union preserved. Every slave who
deserted his Confederate master weakened the Confederate economy
that much. Every white Southerner who had to stay on farm or factory
could not take his place in the Confederate firing line. As we have
seen, Lincoln did not believe that either he or the Congress possessed
any lawful power over slavery in the states, and whatever powers he
possessed over enemy contraband did not apply to loyal owners. The
terms of the Emancipation Proclamation included a careful enumera-
tion of all those states and parts of states that were in rebellion against
the authority of the United States. The Proclamation had no effect
in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and large parts of Virginia
and Louisiana. Lincoln knew, and -told the Congress, that slavery was
doomed everywhere in the United States, if it was doomed anywhere.
The process of war was breaking up the entire social and police system,
upon which the peculiar institution depended. Lincoln's system of
emancipation was the only way he knew to prevent loyal slaveholders
from ultimately suffering the same fate as disloyal ones. And there is
no doubt in my mind that, had Lincoln's plan been -adopted, and had
Lincoln survived the war, he would have attempted to secure some in-
demnification for loyal slaveholders behind the Confederate lines. Lin-
coln always thought of slavery as a national moral responsibility, even
if the legal responsibility was limited by state rights. He did not think
that a man who had sold a slave had the right to keep his money, while
the man who bought him might rightfully have his purchase confis-
cated. The confiscation of private property during the war troubled Lin-
coln deeply, for the same reason that slavery troubled him. For what
was slavery itself but a denial of the foundation of all property rights,
by the confiscation of the right that a man had in himself and in the
fruits of his own labor?
We 'have told the story of the Emancipation Proclamation in our es-
say of -that -name.4 We mention now only that Lincoln failed to secure
the passage of his plan through the Congress. His failure stemmed
from his inability to persuade the border slave state Congressmen to
support it. Although the border slave states had now sealed their fidel-
ity to the Union with their blood, they were as stubborn as their Con-
federate brethren in refusing any step that might, in their own minds,
and however indirectly, admit the wrongfulness of slavery. There was
24. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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both a guilt and a pride which seems to have infected all who had been
immediately touched by the peculiar institution. They would not take
the most obvious measures in -their own interest, if by so doing they
might seem to cast a reproach upon their own past. Kendall and Car-
ey's inability even to mention slavery in a book dominated by that sub-
ject testifies that the power of that reproach has not yet ceased. But
the thirteenth amendment, necessary as it proved to be, ended the legal
existence of slavery in the United States in a way which Lincoln never
desired. But the failure ,to achieve a better way cannot be made a mat-
ter of reproach to him.
8.
Among -the alternatives that Kendall said that Jaffa-and Lincoln-
had refused -to consider was "some sort of radical confrontation of the
Negro problem." 5 But this is just as nebulous as the proposal of a
"negotiated solution" to the sectional crisis. If it means anything, it
means facing the social and political consequences of eventual and
complete emancipation. But of course there had been a great deal of
contemplation of this possibility. And the South had concluded, be-
cause of it, that emancipation must never come. The North had also
concluded, because of it, that slavery must never be extended. The
free state settlers in the territories had no wish to meet Negroes -there,
free or slave. And the slave South believed that unless slavery were
to expand, it would eventually contract, and that emancipation would
come as an economic, if not as a political, necessity. And so there was
a steady hardening of positions on both sides.
In the decade before the Civil War 'the laws governing slavery had
grown steadily harsher. It became impossible in many states for own-
ers ito free slaves, even if they wished to do so. Many of the slaves
that such owners wished to free were of course their own children.
There are countless stories-not all of them invented by Harriet
Beecher Stowe--of the deathbed agonies of men whose children were
security for their debts and who would be sold "down the river" after
their demise. Because of fear of this, some wealthy New Orleans fam-
ilies sent 'their mulatto children to France. The laws also became strin-
gent in forbidding teaching slaves to read, in forbidding their congre-
gating except under strict supervision, in forbidding association be-
tween slaves and free Negroes, and in forbidding free Negroes from
crossing state lines. Free states also had laws forbidding free Negroes
25. Book Review, supra note 10, at 462.
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from entering. But above all, the South had decided, in the wake of
the Wilmot Proviso controversy, that new slave states must, from time
to time, be added .to -the Union, to balance the growing power of the
free states within the federal structure. However impossible such bal-
ance might be in the House, it must at least be preserved in -the Senate.
Ironically enough-from the viewpoint of Kendall and Carey-South-
ern orators constantly appealed to Equality. They said the South must
have Equality with the North, the slave states must have Equality with
the free states. To have less than Equality meant degradation and-
yes-slavery. And to that they would never submit. But if there were
to be new slave states, slaveholders must enter the territories during
their formative period and control the drafting of the state constitutions
with which the new states would apply to Congress for admission. But
as time and experience showed, the legal right of entrance was not
enough. Slavery was a fragile institution. Stray slaves were not like
stray cattle. They had heads as well as legs, and it required an enor-
mously complicated system of slave patrols, of police regulations inte-
grated into a pro-slavery society, to keep slaves working in their places
and to make slavery economically viable. And so the doctrine devel-
oped that came to quintessential expression in Taney's opinion in the
case of Dred Scott.26 That opinion held not only that every slaveholder
had a constitutional right to migrate with his slaves to any federal terri-
tory that was open to settlement, but also that the sole power that
Congress had over the subject of slavery was the power coupled with
the duty to protect the slaveowner in the exercise of his rights. It was
this demand, for a federal slave code for the territories, that broke up
the Democratic National Convention in Charleston, in 1860. It was
this that brought about -the sectional crisis in its final form. Whether
Kendall was simply ignorant of the history of the period, or only pre-
tended to be so, we do not know. But in no just sense was it "Lincoln's
terms" which determined the crisis of 1860. Secession actually began
when the Southern radicals walked out of the Democratic Convention.
And they walked out when Stephen A. Douglas, and his supporters in
the Democratic Party, refused to countenance the demand for a federal
slave code. The demand for a federal slave code had exactly the same
status in the North that a demand for emancipation would have had
in the South. No politician could survive one moment who gave it
a moment's countenance.
The Civil War came then not, -as Kendall seems to suppose, merely
26. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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because the Republican Party, a free-soil party, had elected Abraham
Lincoln president. Lincoln wished to have federal law forbid slavery
in federal territories. In this he differed from Douglas, who wished
to permit the settlers to decide for themselves whether -they would have
freedom or slavery. But by 1860 the South had rejected Douglas as
completely -as they had rejected Lincoln. In some ways he was more
hated, as they regarded him a traitor to their cause. Nothing less than
"affirmative active" guaranteeing slavery in the territories would have
kept the South in the Charleston Convention; nothing less would have
averted secession after Lincoln's election.
We come finally to Kendalrs assertion that the South was "entitled
to secede if the issue was to be drawn on Lincoln's terms."27 We have
just seen that it was not Lincoln who drew the terms of the issue. Even
if one wishes-however extravagantly-to place all responsibility in the
North, it was the Northern Democracy no less than the Republicans
who shared it. And the overwhelming majority of Democrats, led by
Douglas, opposed secession as much as Lincoln. We might argue the
case against secession in the familiar terms of national supremacy ver-
sus state rights. We might easily demonstrate why ,the "national" in-
terest of the North made inconceivable the surrender of the navigation
of the Mississippi to a foreign power and why the land-locked mid-
west in particular---the section from which Lincoln came-could never
contemplate the alliance of an independent and hostile Confederacy
with British Canada. But we think the issue is simpler even than these
obvious political considerations.
In his inaugural address, Lincoln pointed out that the two sections
could not, physically speaking, separate. Political separation, far from
solving any problems, would make them all more acute. The fugitive
slave law, now imperfectly enforced, would then not be enforced at all.
The foreign slave trade, now imperfectly suppressed, might be openly
revived. But above all, what would be done about the territories?
The territories belonged to the United States. Would the South sur-
render its share in them in quitting the Union? If so, why secede?
Would the North, recognizing the Confederacy, agree to divide the ter-
ritories? If so, why not cease to resist the extension of slavery-and
in particular the extension below 36 degrees 30 minutes, the Missouri
Compromise line, as in the Crittenden Compromise-and keep the se-
ceding states in the Union? In short, it would have been senseless for
Lincoln to have resolutely opposed the extension of slavery and then
27. Book Review, supra note 10, at 461-62.
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to have agreed to secession-as Kendall proposes. For secession, had
it succeeded, would have emancipated the South from nearly all restric-
tions upon the extension and perpetuation of slavery. Unless the South
was willing to fight the North for the territories, it made no sense for
them to secede. Unless the North was willing to fight against seces-
sion, it made no sense to stand firm against the extension of slavery
into the territories. To agree to secession, after not agreeing to slav-
ery extension, would only have made the war much harder to win, with-
out making it any -less necessary. Surely Kendall must have seen that.
There is no doubt that Lincoln did!
9.
According to Kendall and Carey, the supreme "symbol" of the Am-
erican political tradition is the virtuous people, or the representatives
of the virtuous people, deliberating under God. We have no quarrel
with this formulation, as far as it goes. We prefer, on the whole, to
speak of the principles of the tradition, rather than its symbols. We
propose -to prove by the American political tradition, that a people be-
come a people only by virtue of the principle of Equality. Here we
would point out that it was 'this same American people, deliberating
according to the laws laid down in the Constitution, laws to which all
equally had consented, -that elected Abraham Lincoln President of the
United States. No violence was used in this election, unless it was in
the South, where there were no electors for Lincoln. No one has ever
been entitled to take office according to the canons of consensus laid
down by Kendall and Carey, if it was not Lincoln. Did he not appeal
to the "basic symbols" precisely in their sense when he spoke ,these
fateful lines on March 4, 1861?
Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice
of the people? Is 'there any better, or equal hope, in the world? . . .
If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be
on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth, and that
justice, will surely prevail, by the judgment of this great tribunal, the
American people.
28
Was not the decision of the seceding states, to break up the govern-
ment, rather than submit to Lincoln's election, a defiance of the vir-
tuous people, deliberating according to the rules of the Constitution,
and under God? Was not that election a decision by a constitutional
majority, in which all rights of constitutional minorities had been care-
28. 4 LINcoLN, supra note 8, at 270 (footnotes omitted).
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fully preserved? Had not Lincoln sworn an oath, before God and the
people, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and to "pre-
serve, protect, and defend the Constitution"? How can Kendall-how
can anyone-call Lincoln's fidelity to that oath, incorporating as it does
all that is sacred to the American political tradition, "imposing one's
own view concerning natural right upon others"?
29
Kendall thought that Jaffa would "launch [his readers] and with
them -the nation upon a political future -the very thought of which is
hair-raising. ... "30 This future would be made up
of an endless series of Abraham Lincolns, each persuaded that he is su-
perior in wisdom and virtue to the Fathers, each prepared to insist that
those who oppose this or that new application of the equality standard
are denying the possibility of self-government, each ultimately willing
to plunge America into Civil War rather than concede his point .... 81
My readers will by now perceive that this is good Confederate carica-
ture suitable for declamation-after playing "Dixie"-at a meeting de-
corated by the stars and bars. The warning strikes me as somewhat
extravagant, given the number of my readers and the magnitude of
the intellectual demands that Kendall says my book puts upon them.
Kendall's premise seems to be that Lincoln-or anyone-who op-
posed American slavery thereby favored each and every "application
of the equality standard." But this standard, we are also told, leads to
"the cooperative commonwealth of men who will be so equal that no
one will be able to tell them apart."' 2 In short, it will lead to the mod-
em totalitarian slave state. Kendall's case against Lincoln then comes
down to this: Lincoln's opposition to slavery leads to slavery.
Now, even if this were not self-contradictory, we would have the
right to ask, why is the slavery to which Lincoln leads us worse than
that which he helped to end? But of course, we are faced here with
a play on words, or a confusion of two meanings of Equality. Lincoln
never sought, or believed in, an equality of condition. What he did
believe in was an equality of rights. Over and over again, he denied
that he thought that men were equal in wisdom, virtue, or ability, or
that they should all have the same rewards. Lincoln said in 1858:
Certainly the negro is not our equal in color-perhaps not in many
other respects; still, in -the right to put into his mouth the bread that his
29. Book Review, supra note 10, at 461-62.





own hands have earned, he is the equal of every other man .... In point-
-ng out that more has been given [to] you, you cannot be justified in
taking away the little which has been given [to] him. All I ask for
the negro is that if you do not like him, let him alone. If God gave
him little. . . that little let him enjoy.
88
Surely no simpler nor more eloquent appeal ever was made to the prin-
ciples of natural justice. Equality here meant nothing more than the
equal right of all men ,to be treated justly. In his message to Congress
of July 4, 1861, Lincoln defined the cause of the Union. It was, he
said, to maintain in the world
that form, and substance of government, whose leading object is, to ele-
vate the condition of men-to lift artificial weights from all shoulders-
to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all-to afford all, an unfettered
start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.84
Kendall and Carey refer repeatedly to Lincoln having "curious"
notions of what Equality meant which, they say, "even his worshippers
cannot deny."883 But, curiously enough, they give no explanation what-
ever of this assertion. One of the speeches which they list as support-
ing this contention is the one from which we have just quoted. Is giv-
ing everyone an unfettered start and -a fair chance what is "curious"?
Is not this the idea behind the Statue of Liberty? Is it curious that
we should be proud to call ourselves the land, not of the slave, but
of the free? Have we not been the Promised Land for countless mil-
lions who have fled from persecution and oppression in the Egypt of
the Old World? Was it not always an anomaly for the Promised Land
itself to have slavery? And is not Abraham Lincoln himself the very
most "basic symbol" within the American political tradition of per-
sonal self-reliance, of bootstrap individualism? In this connection
we cannot refrain from telling one of our favorite Lincoln stories. A
visitor came into his office in the White House one day to find him
blacking his boots. "Why, Mr. President," the astonished man ex-
claimed, "do you black your own boots?" 'Whose boots do you think
I black?" growled Lincoln.
10.
We observed that Kendall and Carey never, to our knowledge, men-
tion slavery in Basic Symbols. But the following passage seems to ele-
vate Inequality to the status we had thought belonged to its opposite.
33. 2 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 520.
34. 4 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 438.
35. Pp. 14, 156.
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Is the American political tradition [they ask] the tradition of the text-
books, which indeed situates the "all men are created equal" clause at
the center of our political experience, or is it the tradition of American
life as it is actually lived and thus a tradition of inequality? 6
Here Kendall and Carey confuse the "is" with the "ought" of a political
tradition. "Life as it is actually lived" should refer not only to what
people do, but also to the ethical norms or imperatives by which they
understand the meaning of what they do. Kendall and Carey refer re-
peatedly to the American people as being a Christian people. Would
they identify Christians solely by their observance of the golden rule,
i.e., only by their lives as they are "actually [i.e., selfishly] lived"?
Kendall, we noted, thinks that Lincoln (and Jaffa) points us toward
a state of society in which men are "so equal that no one will be able
to tell them apart." Yet were not all slaves equally denied the privi-
leges of freedom, without regard to age, sex, virtue, or intelligence?
Did they not all receive the same "wages," regardless of how much or
how little -they worked? Kendall and Carey speak-inaccurately-of
the Declaration of Independence as referring to a Christian people.
Christianity is a revealed religion. But in its references to "self-evi-
dent" truths and to "Nature" and "Nature's God," the Declaration cer-
tainly has reference -to natural, not to revealed theology. Still, the
moral commands of the Decalogue are held by many Christians -to be
knowable by unassisted human reason as well as by Biblical revelation.
And American slavery was as much an institutionalized denial of the
moral claims of the Ten Commandments as Hitler's concentration
camps or the Gulag Archipelago. Since slaves were legally chattels,
they could make no legal contracts, including marriage. How could
children honor their fathers and mothers, when the fathers and mothers
were not lawfully married, when they had no lawful power over their
children, and when they could not acquire any of the property which
is at the foundation of family life? How could the prohibition against
adultery be regarded, when there was no lawful distinction between
fornication and adultery? How could chastity be a virtue for those
who had no lawful power over their own bodies? How could prohibi-
tions against covetousness and theft be addressed to those who could
possess no property and all the fruits of whose labor were taken from
them? How could slaves regard the injunction against bearing false
witness, when their testimony could never be given in court against
white men? And did not the example of Moses, who had killed a slave
36. Pp. 14-15 (emphasis added).
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master, justify any one in striking down another who obstructed his
path to freedom?
American slavery treated all men of a certain class as having their
worth determined by their membership in that class. This is equally
-the root of contemporary totalitarianism. To be elevated, or regarded
as worthy, because one is white, proletarian, or Aryan, or to be de-
graded and scorned as a Negro, a capitalist, or a Jew, does not involve
any ultimate distinction of principle. Kendall's denunciation of the
"cooperative commonwealth" of those whose identities are lost in
"equality" is utterly stultified by his refusal to condemn American slav-
ery and by his condemnation of Lincoln for condemning it.
The "real" American political tradition, say Kendall and Carey, is
not one of Equality. Except in the form of a rhetorical question, they
do not positively assert that it is one of Inequality. Putting together
their various formulations, the "basic symbols" of our tradition are--or
is-the representative assembly (or assemblies) of the virtuous people
deliberating under God. (There is the same difficulty with singular
and plural here, as in the case of The United States.) We have no
quarrel with the emphasis they place upon deliberation, or upon the
need for morality and religion among the institutions of a free people.
We think there is a fundamental misunderstanding implied in their case
for legislative supremacy among the three branches of government.
We think they confuse the supremacy of legislation, conceived as an
act of the sovereign people in its constitution-making role, and legis-
lation as an exercise of the ordinary powers of government provided
by the Constitution. But this difference arises from the far more funda-
mental difference we have, concerning what it is that makes discrete
individuals into a sovereign people, and hence what it is that authorizes
any people to institute government, "laying its foundation on such prin-
ciples and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Kendall and Carey
assume the existence of the people, and never ask what it is, from the
viewpoint of the Founding Fathers, -that entitled the American people
to consider themselves as sovereign. But the answer to that question,
as we propose to demonstrate, is Equality.
The Declaration of Independence, of course, affirms it to be a self-
evident truth, "that all men are created equal." Within short intervals
during the Revolution, the people of -the several states adopted new
constitutions. Most of these contained preambles, bills or declarations
of rights, which gave the "foundation of principles?' upon which they
were to erect the "forms" of government they thought most likely to
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
effect their safety and happiness. For example, Virginia stated "That
all men are by nature equally free and independent"; Pennsylvania,
'That all men are born equally free and independent"; Vermont, "That
all men are born equally free and independent"; Massachusetts, that
"All men are born free and equal"; New Hampshire, that "All men
are born equally free and independent"; Delaware, "That all govern-
ment of right originates from the people [and] is founded in compact
only. ... "37 Maryland also said "that all government of right orig-
inates from the people, [and] is founded in compact only . . .,.
Now we contend that all these statements of principle, where they
are not verbally identical, all mean one and the same thing. It will
be observed that Virginia, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New Hampshire
say "equally free and independent." Massachusetts says "free and
equal." Clearly, "equal" and "independent" mean the same thing.
Also, "born" and "by nature" mean the same thing. Delaware and
Maryland vary this language slightly by saying that rightful government
is "founded in compact only." This expression, we shall see, means sim-
ply that government is the result of an agreement by men who were
originally, or by nature, or born, equally free and independent. Jeffer-
son's "created equal" is simply the most succinct formulation of this
commonly understood doctrine.
Willmoore Kendall devoted the last years of his life to an extraordi-
nary effort to read John Locke out of the American political tradition.
That there was a compact theory much older than the American, he
knew. That Socrates had appealed to one, he knew from the Crito
of Plato. But he didn't trust the Old Pagan, as "The People versus Soc-
rates Revisited" showed. With a great swoop, 'he lighted finally upon
the Mayflower Compact. Here he found at last, if not a compact the-
ory, at least a compact. No matter, if the Pilgrims didn't have a theory,
Kendall would supply it to them! The important thing was that there
was not a word in the Mayflower Compact about Equality, and there
was something-not much, but something-about "advancing the
Christian faith." So Kendall labelled his second chapter in Basic Sym-
bols "In the Beginning: The Mayflower Compact," and tried to prove
that the Founding Fathers-who were now, in fact, the Founding
Great-great-great-great-Grandsons-had always meant substantially
what the men of the Mayflower Compact 'had meant. That is to say,
they had meant what they would or could or should have meant if they
37. Souracms oF OuR Liamnrs 311-82 (R. Perry ed. 1964).
38. Id. at 346.
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too had been born before John Locke. But all this effort was in vain.
While we would never contend that there are no non-Lockean elements
in the Founding, or that the Founding Fathers always interpreted the
Lockean elements in a Lockean manner, Locke is nonetheless there.
The primary appeals to principles in the Revolution are Lockean. The
principle of limited, constitutional government, by which the Fathers
rejected despotism and by which they constructed their own govern-
ments, were fundamentally Lockean. Without understanding this, no
other aspects of the Revolution, or of the American political tradition,
are intelligible.
The spirit of Locke's political teaching is conveyed well by the open-
ing sentence of his First Treatise: "Slavery is so vile and miserable
an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and
courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an English-
man, much less a gentleman, should plead for it."39  The major part
of that treatise is devoted to a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer's Patriar-
cha (1680), a work which attempts to found absolute monarchy upon
a title derived from Adam. Locke demonstrates the absurdity of such
a title, not to mention the difficulty of finding its rightful possessor!
But consider the language of the Continental Congress, in the Declara-
tion of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms, July 6, 1775:
If it was possible for men, who exercise their reason to believe, that
the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race
to hold an absolute property in, and an unbounded power over others
...the inhabitants of these colonies might at least require from the
parliament of Great Britain some evidence, that this dreadful authority
over them, has been granted to that body.40
Did ever a great revolution in human affairs ever begin with such sar-
casm? Can one not hear 'the very accents of Locke's First Treatise
as he rakes old Filmer over the coals? One thinks, for example, of
Sir Robert's derivation of kingly power from paternal power, citing the
Biblical injunction to honor one's father. To this Locke retorted with
evident glee that the Bible speaks of honoring one's father and mother
and asks why Sir Robert does not find queenly as well as kingly au-
thority in such injunctions. But the Continental Congress, in rejecting
the proposition that any part of the human race (not merely English-
men vis-ti-vis Englishmen) might hold a right of property in any other
39. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 7 (T. Cook ed. 1947) [hereinafter
cited as Two TREAuTsEs].
40. DOCUMENTS OF AMEmiCAN IhSTORY 92 (H. Commager ed. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as DocuMENsT].
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part, clearly condemned in principle all slavery. And this they might
do, only if, in their right to non-despotic rule, all men are equal.
In his attack on Filmer, Locke characterizes his "system" in this "little
compass." "lMt is," says Locke, "no more but this":
That all government is absolute monarchy.
4'
"And ,the ground he builds on is this":
That no man is born free.
42
Robert A. Goldwin observes that "Locke's own political teaching may
be stated in opposite terms but with similar brevity ... "48 Gold-
win's first Lockean proposition is this:
All government is limited in its powers and
exists only by the consent of the governed.
44
And, says Goldwin, the ground Locke builds on is this:
All men are born free.45
The argument for absolute monarchy---or despotism, for they are the
same-is grounded in Locke in -the proposition that no man is born
free. The argument for limited government (or constitutional govern-
ment, for they are -the same) is grounded in Locke in the proposition
that all men are born free. But we shall see that in Locke-and in the
nature of things-the proposition that all men are born free is itself
an inference from the proposition that all men are born equal. The
equality of all men by nature and the freedom of all men by nature
differ as the concavity of a curved line differs from its convexity. The
two are distinguishable, but inseparable.
Let us now turn to the famous passage in The Second Treatise, in
which Locke considers "what state all men are naturally in.''1 0  It is,
he says,
a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their pos-
sessions -and persons as they -think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other
man.47
But it is also, he continues,
[a] state .. .of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is re-
41. Two TREATisES, supra note 39, at 8.
42. Id.
43. HISTORY OF PoLrrIcAL PHIosomHy 451 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey eds. 1972).
44. Id.
45. Id.




ciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident than [meaning thereby that it is self-evident] that creatures
of the same species and rank. should also be equal one amongst
another without subordination and subjection .... 48
We would re-phrase Locke's -argument as follows: there is no differ-
ence between man and man as there is between man and, for ex-
ample, dog, such that one is recognizable as the other's natural super-
ior. And if men are not naturally subordinate, one to another-as all
the 'brute creation are naturally subordinate to man-then they are nat-
urally not in a state of government, or civil society. They are, instead,
naturally free and independent, or born free and independent. But
they are born free and independent, because they are born-or cre-
ated--equal.
There can be no question-and Kendall and Carey do not ques-
tion-that the just powers of government in the American political tra-
dition are derived from the consent of the governed. Kendall and Ca-
rey treat consent however as if it were an ultimate and not a derived
principle. But that is not the way Locke or the Founders treated it.
They derived it from man's natural freedom and equality. It is the rec-
ognition of Equality which not only gives rise to consent, but also which
provides consent with a positive content of meaning. Kendall and
Carey, by allowing consent to stand alone, as if it were an ultimate prin-
ciple, have no basis for saying what it is to which men might reasonably
consent. In 1854, Lincoln quoted his notable antagonist thus:
Judge Douglas frequently, with bitter irony and sarcasm, paraphrases
our argument by saying: "The white people of Nebraska are good
enough to govern themselves, but they are not good enough to govern
a few miserable negroes!!"
Well, I doubt not that the people of Nebraska are, and will continue
to be as good as the average of people elsewhere. I do not say the
contrary. What I do say is, that no man is good enough to govern an-
other man, without that other's consent.49
Kendall and Carey, like Douglas, do not see that the people's right to
give their consent is itself derived from the equality of dl men and
therefore limits and directs what it is to which they may rightfully con-
sent. Their view leads to the conclusion that whatever any particular
people may be persuaded by demagogues to agree or consent to, be-
comes "right." Calling the people "virtuous" and saying that they de-
48. Id.
49. 2 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 266.
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liberate "under God" may become a mere cloak for vice and hypocrisy,
as our examination of the ethics of slavery showed.
That men are by nature free and equal is the ground simultaneously
of political obligation-of consent as the immediate source of the just
powers of government-and of a doctrine of limited government and
of an ethical code. Because man is by nature a rational being, he may
not rule other rational beings as if they were mere brutes. Because
man is not all-wise or all-powerful, because his reason is swayed by his
passions, he may not be a judge in his own cause, and he may not there-
fore rule other men despotically. Men do not need the consent of
brute creation to rule over it. Nor does God need the consent of men
rightfully to exercise his Providential rule over them. Man is the in-
between being, between beast and God, "a little -lower than the an-
gels." Consent is -that ground of obligation which corresponds with this
"in-betweenness." It is the contemplation of this universe, articulated
as it is into the intelligible hierarchy of beast, man, and God, which
not only brings consent as a principle into view, but also enlightens it,
and brings it thereby into harmony with "the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God." To repeat, the proposition that all men are created
equal implies an understanding of man, in the light of the universe,
in the light of the distinction between the human and the subhuman on
the one hand, and of the human and the superhuman on the other. As
we 'have already observed, it does not, for this reason, ignore 'the very
important differences between man and man. On the contrary, it is
for the sake of those differences that it denies any man the right to
rule others, as if those others were beasts. And there are no standing
rules, and impartial judges, to govern the differences between slaves
and their owners and masters. For -the rule of a master to be a matter
of right, -the master would have to differ from the servant, as God is
supposed to differ from man. Whatever one's beliefs as to the exist-
ence of Divinity, it is evident-or self-evident--4hat no man possesses
that power or wisdom which we suppose that God-if He exists-pos-
sesses. While not supposing for a moment that the Founders did not
believe in the actual existence of God, their assumptions about Equal-,
ity-which include assumptions about the subhuman and the super-
human-are independent of the validity of any particular religious be-
liefs. In the decisive respect, their assumptions are not assumptions
at all, but observations of a world in which the difference between men
and beasts provides a clear and distinct idea of what the Divine nature,
in its politically relevant aspects, must be.
Kendall and Carey suppose that the constitutional morality of The
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Federdlist has nothing whatever to do with Equality. That they are
wrong becomes clear the moment one understands that the proposition
that all men are created equal is not about man alone, but about man,
God, and Nature; and that Nature implies the difference between the
human and the sub-human, as well as that between the human and the
super-human. Consider the famous passage of Madison's in the fifty-
first Federalist:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. -If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.50
Here the very nature of the problem that constitutionalism is meant to
solve is determined by the meaning of Equality.
But does not constitutionalism imply an ethics as well as a politics?
Do we not recognize -that the equality of all men by nature, leading
as it does to civil society, is the justification for the inequalities of civil
society? Do we not thereby see that officials are but men and must
live under the laws that they make and administer? (Abraham Lin-
coln: "The master not only governs the slave without his consent; but
he governs him by a set of rules altogether different from those which
he prescribes for himself.""1 ) Do we not recognize that our consent
makes their acts lawful, and that in obeying them, we are not deferring
to our superiors in nature, but only to the principle of authority that
is in ourselves? Is it not this that makes obedience not demeaning (not
slavish), but dignified, and sometimes even noble? But still further,
does not Equality, which makes our consent necessary to the laws we
obey, oblige us to recognize the same rights in other men? Does it
not also tell us that we may not consider other men mere means to
our ends-as we may consider the brute creation-or as we may be
considered by a Divine Providence whose power and wisdom so far
transcends our own? (Are we not taught by Revelation that God does
not consider us as mere means, but that this is not necessary to his be-
ing, but represents the miracle of His grace?) Do not all the totalitar-
ian slave states of our time rest upon theoretical propositions in which
race or class differences delude some men -to consider themselves su-
perhuman? And does not this delusion lie at the root of their bestial-
50. THE FEDERAST 337 (Modem Library ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Tim FED-
ERAUsf].
51. 2 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 266.
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ity? Is it not this that makes them think that, for the sake of the class-
less society, or the thousand-year Reich, everything is permitted to
them? Surely Abraham Lincoln was right when he said that the doc-




There is a tendency among Conservatives to identify Equality with
some species of socialism or-in Kendall's words-with "the coopera-
tive commonwealth of men who will be so equal that no one will be
able to tell them apart." But the doctrine of Equality, in particular
in its Lockean sense, is essential to the defense of the institution of
private property in the modem world. For the doctrine of Equality
holds that what men are by nature, that is, prior to civil society, deter-
mines what purposes civil society may rightfully serve. It is this that
determines what rights are inalienable, and what rights may-or
must-reasonably be surrendered to society. It was axiomatic for -the
Founders that the rights of conscience were never surrendered to civil
society, and that therefore civil society might never rightfully enact laws
in matters that were wholly and exclusively matters of conscience. It
took more than a generation after the Revolution to uproot all the co-
lonial laws which, directly or indirectly, "established" religion, by giving
one or another religious belief the assistance of law. Moreover, the
determined way in which men like Jefferson and Madison acted to get
rid, not only of religious establishment in all its forms, but also of such
vestiges of feudal law as primogeniture and entail, proves how little re-
gard they had for that colonial past Kendall tried to make the ground of
the American political tradition.
Primogeniture and entail were anachronisms on the American scene.
They were essentially limitations upon the right of a man to control
his own property and to dispose of it at his pleasure. They were props
of aristocracy, inimical to the spirit both of democracy and of capitalism.
They were, so to speak, elements of a "Tory socialism." But Locke
had taught that men were by nature property-acquiring animals. He
had taught that both life and liberty became valuable and were them-
selves natural rights, above all because they culminated in the posses-
sion and enjoyment of property. No one in America who heard the Dec-
laration of Independence read out for the first time had any doubt
that pursuing happiness meant primarily, as Virginia had already put
52. Id. at 499.
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it, "acquiring and possessing property." It was because the Parliament
of Great Britain had appeared to assert a right to tax the colonists with-
out their consent by making laws and statutes "in all cases whatsoever,"
that they had revolted. But men like George Washington-as vigor-
ous a land speculator as ever lived-were driven into rebellion in part
by their inability to get the government at Westminster to grant patents
and titles to the land -they had surveyed in such places as the Ohio val-
ley. Government, in their view, existed to facilitate the acquisition and
enjoyment of private property. Such property might be taxed-with
their consent-so that the government might be able to protect that
same property. But it might not tax them to render nugatory, in any
manner or sense, their efforts in acquiring and possessing property. The
principle of Equality, far from enfranchising any leveling action of gov-
ernment, is the ground for the recognition of those human differences
which arise naturally, but in civil society, when human industry and ac-
quisitiveness are emancipated. We saw that Madison reflected the
doctrine of Equality, when he attributed the need for constitutional gov-
ernment, and constitutional morality, to the difference between men
and angels. But he reflected it no less when, in the tenth Federalist, he
put as the "first object of government," the protection "of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property . . ... 3 In his Second
Treatise, Locke had put the origin of property in human labor. It was
the natural right-the equal right-which each man had to his own
body, and therefore to the labor of that body, that was the ultimate
foundation of the right to private property in civil society. How can
Kendall and Carey not have seen, as Lincoln saw, that the denial of
Equality was the denial of the principle upon which private property, as
well as every other personal freedom, rested? Nothing illustrates bet-
ter Lincoln's egalitarianism, and his attitude toward property, than the
following message, which he sent to a meeting of the Workingmen's
Association in New York, during the Civil War:
Let not him who is houseless [wrote Lincoln] pull down the house of
another; but let him labor diligently and build one for himself, thus by
example assuring 'that his own [house] shall be safe from violence when
built.54
Surely here is the wisdom of Solomon and of a just and generous Con-
servatism.
53. Tn FEDE1ALiST, supra note 50, at 55 (emphasis added).
54. 7 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 259-60.
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12.
We turn finally to two myths propagated by Kendall and Carey
which, it seems to us, have been stumbling blocks for American
Conservatives-particularly for those who have forgotten their Ameri-
can -history. According to Basic Symbols it was Lincoln who somehow
invented a "constitutional status" for the Declaration and, by his enum-
eration of "four score and seven years" in the Gettysburg Address,
spuriously caused the occasion for Independence to become that of our
birth "as a nation." What was established on July 4, 1776, they say,
was not a nation, but only "a baker's dozen of new sovereignties."",
In short, what the thirteen colonies did that day was not merely to de-
clare themselves independent of Great Britain, but .to declare them-
selves independent of each other. Here is Lincoln, taking up that
claim, in his message to Congress, July 4, 1861.
Therein [that is, by -the Declaration of Independence] the "United Colo-
nies" were declared to be "Free and Independent States"; but, even then,
'the object plainly was not to declare their independence of one another,
or of the Union; but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge, and
their mutual action, before, at the time, and afterwards, abundantly
show. 56
How can Kendall and Carey revive this old Confederate propaganda
without even alluding to the "abundant" evidence with which Lincoln
had refuted it?
However indeterminate the character of American federalism may
have 'been at that early date, there can 'be no question but 'that the thir-
teen former colonies, now states, remained united, and always, before
the rest of the world, assumed the character of a single person. Passing
over the pledge of unity in 'the Declaration itself, and the further pledge
in the Articles of Confederation that the Union shall be perpetual, we
would direct attention to Article VI of 'the Constitution. It declares
that "All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United
States under this 'Constitution, as under the Confederation." Thus the
United States "before the Adoption of this Constitution," 'the United
States "under the Confederation," and the United States "under this
Constitution," are all the same United States. According to Article VI,
the one from which the many were formed-according to et pluribus
unum, the motto of the United States---did not result from the Constitu-
55. Pp. 88, 90.
56. 4 LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 433 (footnotes omitted).
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tion. But if the Constitution did not cause the Union, then the Union
(that is the Union of the People of the United States) must have caused
the Constitution. But if the Union as a sovereign entity had an origin
before 1787, when else can it have been except on July 4, 1776? If
the Declaration gave birth to the Union which gave birth to the Consti-
tution, it must itself have constitutional status. 7 And so it always has
had in the statutes of the United States. Lincoln was of course perfectly
correct in what he said at Gettysburg, and elsewhere, upon this topic.
But is it proper to refer to the Union which came into being in 1776
as a nation? Certainly neither Union nor nation were fully formed-
any more than any other infant-at birth. But Thomas Jefferson, writ-
ing to James Madison, on August 30, 1823, referred without hesitation
to a meeting that had taken place the previous month, as "an anniver-
sary assemblage of the nation on its birthday."58  I would venture to
doubt whether anyone can find any expression by any American states-
man during the first fifty years following independence that contradicts
the opinion that July 4, 1776, was the birthday of the nation. These
were the formative years of Lincoln's life. He grew up, strange to say,
believing what Jefferson said about our being a nation, just as he grew
up believing Jefferson when he wrote "that all men are created equal."
We come now to Kendall and Carey's contention that Equality,
which had admittedly (and unfortunately) loomed so large in the De-
claration, had somehow disappeared when the Constitution, and the
federal bill of rights, came to be written. Our readers will readily per-
ceive that this alleged omission is an omission, only if the Declaration
itself lacked constitutional status. But we have just proved that it does
have that status. The Declaration authorized each of the thirteen states
separately, and all of them collectively, -to "institute new Government"
such as to them "shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Hap-
piness." The statement of principles in the Declaration of Independ-
ence properly accompanied a revolutionary change in political alle-
giance. It also properly accompanied a dissolution of one social compact
and the formation of another (or others). There was a good deal of
contemporaneous discussion as to whether the dissolving of the political
allegiance of the colonists to the British crown also constituted a dis-
solution of the social compact among themselves. According to James
Madison, "The question was brought before Congress at its first session
by Doctor Ramsay, who contested the election of William Smith; who,
57. DcumNTS, supra note 40, at 100 (editor's note).
58. A CASEBOOK ON THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 32 (R. Ginsberg ed. 1967).
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though born in South Carolina, had been absent at the date of inde-
pendence. The decision was, that his birth in the Colony made him
a member of society in its new as well as its original state."' ;" We can
easily imagine some Tories, who were driven out of the country, con-
testing this decision! In any event, there was no such revolutionary
change as occurred in 1776, in the interval between 1776 and 1787.
The absence of a new declaration of principles in 1787, far from in-
dicating that the Framers had forgotten the old one, is a sign that they
remembered it perfectly. Had they changed their minds about those
principles in any way, a new one might have been indicated. But they
had not changed their minds, and the country that ratified -the Constitu-
tion understood perfectly that the principles of 1776, as expressed not
only in the national Declaration of Independence, but also in all the state
declarations accompanying the state constitutions, governed the new
Constitution as, well.
The principles of the Declaration are not, however, merely pre-
supposed in the Constitution. They are present in the very first words
of the Constitution as those words were understood by those who
drafted and adopted it. "We the People of the United States," implies
the existence of a compact in precisely the sense in which Delaware
and Maryland used that term in their declarations of rights. In the de-
bates on nullification, in the early 1830's, speakers on all sides of that
difficult question, prefaced their remarks by saying that compact was
the basis of all free government. In one of his last writings, an essay
on "Sovereignty," Madison affirmed as a matter of course "that all
power in just and free governments is derived from compact."'0  By
compact, he said, he meant "the theory which contemplates a certain
number of individuals as meeting and agreeing to form one political so-
ciety, in order that the rights, the safety, and the interest of each may be
under the safeguard of the whole." 1 "The first supposition" of such an
agreement, said Madison, "is that each individual being previously in-
dependent of the others, the compact which is to make them one so-
ciety must result from the free consent of every individual. 60 If then
the people of the United States, who ordained the Constitution of the
United States, are a free people, they must have been formed into civil
59. 4 LErrnns AND Owmm WmTNGas oF JAM.S MADISON 392 (R. Worthington ed.
1884).
60. Id. at 391.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 392.
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society by the free consent of every individual. But that would not be
possible unless every individual, then and since, forming piart of the
people of the United States, like all mankind, in the original and origin-
ating sense, had been by the laws of nature and of nature's God, "crea-
ted equal."

